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Abstract
BACKGROUND: Previous studies have shown that alcohol-dependent (AD)
individuals have difficulties inferring other people's emotion, understanding
humor, and detecting a faux pas. This study aimed at further understanding
the nature of such "Theory of Mind" (ToM) difficulties. METHODS: A total of
34 recently detoxified AD and 34 paired controls were compared based on
2 nonverbal and video-based false belief tasks. These tasks were designed
to identify 3 different types of deficits: (i) a deficit in dealing with the general
task demands, (ii) a selective deficit in self-perspective inhibition, and (iii) a
deficit in tracking the other person's mental state. (i) and (ii) are compatible
with the hypothesis of a prefrontal cortex dysfunction being at the origin of AD
individuals' social difficulties, while (iii) would suggest the possible contribution of
a dysfunction of the temporo-parietal junction in explaining the social difficulties.
RESULTS: Group analyses highlighted that AD indivi...
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Theory of Mind Diﬃculties in Patients with Alcohol
Dependence: Beyond the Prefrontal Cortex Dysfunction
Hypothesis
Francois Maurage, Philippe de Timary, Juan Martin Tecco, Stephane Lechantre,
and Dana Samson
Background: Previous studies have shown that alcohol-dependent (AD) individuals have diﬃculties
inferring other people’s emotion, understanding humor, and detecting a faux pas. This study aimed at
further understanding the nature of such “Theory of Mind” (ToM) diﬃculties.
Methods: A total of 34 recently detoxiﬁed AD and 34 paired controls were compared based on 2
nonverbal and video-based false belief tasks. These tasks were designed to identify 3 diﬀerent types of
deﬁcits: (i) a deﬁcit in dealing with the general task demands, (ii) a selective deﬁcit in self-perspective
inhibition, and (iii) a deﬁcit in tracking the other person’s mental state. (i) and (ii) are compatible with
the hypothesis of a prefrontal cortex dysfunction being at the origin of AD individuals’ social diﬃcul-
ties, while (iii) would suggest the possible contribution of a dysfunction of the temporo-parietal junction
in explaining the social diﬃculties.
Results: Group analyses highlighted that AD individuals performed worse on the 2 false belief tasks
than controls. Individual analyses showed, however, that just under half of the AD individuals were
impaired compared to controls. Moreover, most of the AD individuals who were impaired showed a
deﬁcit in tracking the other person’s belief. This deﬁcit was linked to disease-related factors such as ill-
ness duration, average alcohol consumption, and craving but not to general reasoning abilities, depres-
sion, anxiety, or demographic variables.
Conclusions: Just under half of the AD individuals tested showed a ToM deﬁcit, and in most cases,
the deﬁcit concerned the tracking of other people’s mental states. Such a type of deﬁcit has previously
been associated with lesions to the temporo-parietal brain areas, indicating that a prefrontal cortex dys-
function may not be the sole origin of the social cognition deﬁcits observed in alcohol dependence.
Key Words: Theory of Mind, False Belief, Mentalizing, Prefrontal Cortex, Temporo-Parietal
Junction.
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE WHICH is a very fre-quent psychiatric disorder with very important conse-
quences for mortality and morbidity is associated with
deﬁcits in social interactions (Kornreich et al., 2011; Levol-
a et al., 2014), poor ties to social groups (Chou et al.,
2011), and tendencies to social estrangement (Thompson
et al., 2010). Furthermore, diﬃculties in social interactions
appear as a major factor of relapse in detoxiﬁed alcohol-
dependent (AD) individuals (Zywiak et al., 2003) and
improvement in the social network and social self-eﬃcacy
as a main predictor of recovery in abstinent alcoholics
(Kelly et al., 2012).
However, the reasons for these social diﬃculties have still
been scarcely explored. Most studies aiming at identifying
the sources of social diﬃculties in AD individuals have
focused on diﬃculties in emotional processing. For example,
it has been shown that AD individuals have diﬃculties recog-
nizing emotion expressions (especially anger) from faces
(Kornreich et al., 2003; Maurage et al., 2011), postures
(Maurage et al., 2009), or voice prosody (Monnot et al.,
2001).
A few studies have also shown that AD individuals have
diﬃculties in detecting humor (Uekermann et al., 2007),
detecting that someone said unintentionally something hurt-
ful, that is, a faux pas (Thoma et al., 2013) or reﬂecting on
their own or other people’s mental states (Bosco et al.,
2014). This suggests that they may have a “Theory of Mind”
(ToM) impairment, that is, diﬃculties inferring not only
emotions but also other mental states such as desires, inten-
tions, and beliefs. This study focuses on this particular aspect
and aims at narrowing down the type of diﬃculties that AD
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individuals may have when confronted with mentalizing
tasks.
The emerging view is that ToM is not a unitary function
and that diﬃculties in ToM tasks may take various forms
(Hartwright et al., 2012; Le Bouc et al., 2012; Samson,
2009). First of all, many ToM tasks are story based and place
high demands on general cognitive control abilities (keeping
track of the story, remembering who is who and who did
what). Such general cognitive control abilities mostly depend
on the integrity of the prefrontal cortex (Kane and Engle,
2002). Given that AD individuals have been shown to have
memory and executive function impairments (Cordovil De
Sousa Uva et al., 2010; No€el et al., 2001; Pitel et al., 2009), it
may well be that this interferes with the patients’ abilities to
deal with the incidental demands of ToM tasks, while their
ToM abilities per se may still be preserved. For instance, deﬁ-
cits in complex ToM tasks such as faux pas or humor pro-
cessing have been related to deﬁcits in working memory
(Thoma et al., 2013) and executive functions (Uekermann
et al., 2007), respectively.
It may also be that the processes that are core to ToM rea-
soning are impaired in AD individuals. Neuropsychological
evidence obtained out of the ﬁeld of alcohol dependence,
from patients with acquired brain damage, suggests that
these core processes are of 2 types. On the one hand, there
are processes that allow us to track other peoples’ mental
states (their desires, beliefs, and intentions) and that recruit
the temporo-parietal junction (Samson, 2009; Samson et al.,
2004). Patients with such deﬁcits have diﬃculties realizing
that someone else’s mental state is relevant to a particular sit-
uation and do not spontaneously infer the other person’s
mental state unless explicitly asked to do so. In daily life,
such deﬁcits manifest themselves through misunderstandings
during social interactions because the patients have not
inferred all the relevant information about the other person’s
mental state. On the other hand, there are processes that
allow us to resist interference from our own perspective
(Samson et al., 2005), in situations where an agent’s desires,
intentions, or beliefs are incongruent with our own mental
states. The latter processes have been shown to recruit the
lateral prefrontal cortex (Hartwright et al., 2012; Samson,
2009). Patients suﬀering from such a deﬁcit become extre-
mely egocentered and ﬁnd it very hard to realize that other
people may have a diﬀerent view.
With the aim of identifying the types of ToM diﬃculties
associated with AD, we used 2 nonverbal mentalizing tasks:
one which placed high demands on self-perspective inhibi-
tion but which had direct mentalizing instructions and
placed therefore low demands on the spontaneous tracking
of the other person’s mental state (we will refer to this task
as the “Inhibit-Task”) and one which has no direct mental-
izing instructions and places therefore high demands on the
spontaneous tracking of the other person’s mental state but
where the demands in terms of self-perspective inhibition
were reduced (we will refer to this task as the “Track-
Task”). In both tasks, there were nonmentalizing control
items allowing us to see whether the participant could deal
with the general and incidental task demands. The 2 tasks
have been used previously to understand the origin of ToM
impairments in healthy elderly subjects (Bailey and Henry,
2008), schizophrenic individuals (Bailey and Henry, 2010),
and individuals with acquired brain damage (Apperly et al.,
2004, 2005) and showed distinct types of mentalizing
impairments, but these tasks have never been used with AD
individuals before. If AD individuals have mentalizing
problems due to a general reduction in cognitive resources,
then we should expect that their impairment on the mental-
izing items in any of the 2 tasks will be accompanied by an
impairment on the nonmentalizing control items. On the
other hand, if AD individuals have mentalizing problems
because of a dysfunction of the core ToM processes, then
we should observe selective impairments on the mentalizing
items with spared performance on the nonmentalizing con-
trol items. Furthermore, depending on the task which is
aﬀected, we could further narrow down the ToM processes
aﬀected to either the processes involved in the inhibition of
one’s own perspective (which could be linked to the known
prefrontal cortex dysfunction associated with AD) or the
processes involved in tracking the other person’s mental
state (which may suggest that dysfunction in other areas
than the prefrontal cortex also contribute to the social cog-
nition deﬁcits in AD).
Because diﬀerent types of ToM deﬁcits may be associated
with alcohol dependence, we decided, in addition to group
comparisons, to also compare the performance of each AD
subject to the performance of the subset of controls that were
best matched for demographic variables. This allowed us for
each AD subject to identify whether the subject was impaired
in the tasks and, if so, which type of deﬁcit explained the
performance.
MATERIALS ANDMETHODS
Participants
Thirty-four inpatients (8 women), presenting with a DSM-IV
diagnosis of alcohol dependence (American Psychiatric Association,
1994), were recruited during the fourth week of their treatment in a
detoxiﬁcation center (“Che^ne aux Haies Hospital,” Mons, Bel-
gium). They had all abstained from alcohol for at least 3 weeks
(M = 25.12 days, SD = 3.08). The exclusion criterion was the exis-
tence of a history of any other Axis I DSM-IV disorder and speciﬁ-
cally the existence of dependence to any other drug except nicotine.
The mean alcohol consumption among AD participants before
detoxiﬁcation was 20.12 alcohol units (=10 g of pure ethanol) per
day (SD = 9.45). The mean duration of alcohol dependence was
12.26 years (SD = 8.53). The mean number of previous detoxiﬁca-
tion treatments was 2.06 (SD = 1.91).
AD individuals were matched for age, gender, and education lev-
els (measured as the number of years of education completed since
starting primary school) with a control group composed of 34 vol-
unteers (8 women) recruited by means of advertisement and who
participated in a larger study in exchange of a compensation of
30 euros. Controls were free of any history of Axis I DSM-IV psy-
chiatric disorder or substance abuse/dependence except for nicotine.
The mean alcohol consumption among controls was 0.79 units per
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day (SD = 1.12), and they abstained from any alcohol consumption
for at least 3 days before testing.
Twenty-two AD participants and 11 controls were smokers: the
mean number of cigarettes per day was 3.44 among controls
(SD = 7.06) and 10.85 among AD individuals (SD = 10.28). Con-
trols were free of medication. Eight AD individuals still received
low benzodiazepines doses (i.e., diazepam or lorazepam). The mean
benzodiazepine doses received (expressed in diazepam equivalents)
was 7.44 mg/d (SD = 12.56). Table 1 summarizes the characteris-
tics of the AD and healthy control groups.
Procedure
After providing written informed consent, participants were
tested individually on a large battery of control measures and social
cognition tasks. Testing was divided into 2 sessions of 2 hours. The
results of only 2 of these tasks are presented here.
Experimental Tasks
The 2 experimental tasks were based on the false belief paradigm,
which explores the ability to infer that someone else’s representation
of the state of the world does not match the real state of the world.
The false belief task is a key task widely used in the literature to
assess someone’s ability to infer other people’s mental states in order
to understand and predict their behavior (i.e., “ToM”; Premack and
Woodruﬀ, 1978). The 2 tasks were nonverbal and video based. The
tasks varied along 2 characteristics: (i) the demands in self-perspec-
tive inhibition and (ii) the explicitness with which participants were
invited to take the protagonist’s perspective (to test whether partici-
pants spontaneously engage in belief reasoning).
Track-Task. Participants were presented with 48 short videos: 12
false belief, 12 memory control, and 24 ﬁller trials (these ﬁller trials
were used to ensure that subjects did not base their responses on
superﬁcial strategies; for details about the task, see Apperly et al.,
2004; Samson et al., 2004). Participants were instructed to ﬁnd in
which of 2 identically looking boxes a green cube was located. They
were told that the woman in the video will help them ﬁnd the green
object. In the false belief trials (see Fig. 1), participants saw the
woman watching in which box the green object was located—the
angle of the camera was such that participants could not see where
the green object was located (Fig. 1A). The woman then left the
room, and while she was out, the man swapped the 2 boxes
(Fig. 1B). Once back, the woman pointed to one of the boxes
(Fig. 1C). To ﬁnd the green object, participants had to infer that the
woman had a false belief (given that she did not see the swap of
boxes) and that, therefore, the green object was located in the oppo-
site box to the one the woman pointed at. Importantly, at the time
participants could infer that the woman had a false belief (i.e., when
the man swapped the boxes), participants had no idea where the
green object was located. There was thus no need to resist interfer-
ence from one’s own knowledge of the true location of the green
object when reasoning about the woman’s belief (low self-perspec-
tive inhibition demands). However, because the main task instruc-
tion consisted in ﬁnding the green object, participants had to realize
that paying attention to the woman, and more particularly her
belief, was useful for their task (high spontaneous tracking
demands). The memory control and ﬁller trials could be solved with-
out false belief reasoning (see Method S1). For each participant, we
recorded the number of correct responses for the false belief trials
(maximum score: 12/12), the memory control trials (maximum
score: 12/12), and the ﬁller trials (maximum score: 24/24).
Inhibit-Task. Participants were presented with 36 short nonverbal
videos: 12 false belief, 12 memory control, and 12 ﬁller trials (for
details about the task, see Samson et al., 2005). The videos were sim-
ilar to the ones used in the Track-Task except that the participants
were asked to indicate which of the 2 boxes the woman would open
ﬁrst to ﬁnd the green object and that, this time, the camera angle
allowed the participant to see in which box the man was hiding the
green object (see Fig. 1D,E). Thus, in this task, inferring the
woman’s false belief required from participant that they inhibit their
own knowledge about the true location of the object (high self-per-
spective inhibition demands; Fig. 1F). However, the task instruc-
tions invited directly the participants to pay attention to the woman
for their task (low spontaneous tracking demands). Here again, the
memory control and ﬁller trials could be solved without false belief
reasoning (see Method S1). For each participant, we recorded the
number of correct responses for the belief trials (maximum score:
12/12), the memory control trials (maximum score: 12/12), and the
ﬁller trials (maximum score: 12/12).
Each of the 2 experimental tasks was presented at the beginning
of 1 session. The Track-Task was always presented before the Inhi-
bit-Task so that the extent to which a participant spontaneously
tracks the woman’s belief could be reliably tested without contami-
nation from the explicit instructions of the Inhibit-Task.
Besides the global comparison of the scores of the AD and con-
trol subjects on the false belief and memory control trials of both
tasks, each AD individual was categorized as having either spared
belief reasoning or 1 of 3 types of deﬁcits. To achieve this, results of
each AD individual on the false belief and memory control trials of
the Track-Task and Inhibit-Task were compared with the score of 5
controls1 matched by age, sex, and education level. In line with
Crawford and colleagues (2003) operationalized deﬁnition of a deﬁ-
cit in single-case studies, we considered that a patient’s performance
in a task was impaired when the performance was signiﬁcantly dif-
Table 1. Comparison Between Demographic, Psychological, Cognitive,
and Illness-Related Measures of Healthy and Alcohol-Dependent (AD)
Individuals
Healthy controls
(N = 34) (n or
mean  SD)
AD individuals
(N = 34) (n or
mean  SD)
Demographic variables
Male/female ratio 26/8 26/8
Age (years) 47.15  10.42 48.85  8.75
Education (years) 11.50  2.79 11.56  3.07
Cigarettes per day 3.44  7.06 10.85  10.28**
Smokers 11 22
Control measures
Raven Matrix 48.00  6.44 39.53  9.89***
STAI-statea 30.38  10.01 41.68  14.26***
STAI-traita 36.26  9.51 49.47  12.56***
BDIb 3.06  2.42 10.24  7.29***
Interpersonal Reactivity Index
Empathic concern 27.15  5.03 25.03  5.62
Personal distress 18.32  3.91 19.82  6.11
Fantasy scale 20.44  5.07 18.41  5.61
Perspective taking 24.65  4.40 20.74  4.99**
Disease-related factors
Obsessive-Compulsive
Drinking Scale (OCDS)
obsessive thinking
1  2.50 5.79  4.25***
OCDS compulsive behavior 0.62  1.44 3.68  3.39***
OCDS global score 1.65  3.83 9.15  7.05***
Number of drinks per day 0.79  1.12 20.12  9.45***
Number of inpatient days – 25.12  3.08
Alcoholism duration (in years) – 12.26  8.53
Previous hospitalization – 2.06  1.91
aState Trait Anxiety Inventory for adults.
bBeck Depression Inventory Scale.
**p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
1This meant that 2 additional female controls were recruited.
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ferent from controls (p < 0.05, 1-tailed) in a modiﬁed t-test adapted
to single-case studies (Crawford and Howell, 1998).
Based on these analyses, participants were considered as having
no belief reasoning deﬁcit when they showed a comparable perfor-
mance to that of the controls on all the diﬀerent trials of the Track-
Task and Inhibit-Task (see Table 2). In addition, it was important
to ensure that the good performance on the false belief trials was
not just resulting from the use of a superﬁcial response strategy
(such as always choosing the box opposite to the one the woman
pointed at in the Track-Task, for example). The good performance
on the false belief trials needed thus to be accompanied by a good
performance on the ﬁller trials.
The other participants were classiﬁed in 1 of 3 deﬁcits depending
on their pattern of performance across the diﬀerent trial types of the
Inhibit-Task and the Track-Task (see Table 2 for a summary):
Type 1 Deficit. A selective self-perspective inhibition deficit
whereby the participant wrongly attributes his own knowledge of
the state of the world to other people. We expect here that the par-
ticipant will only have diﬃculties when he has privileged access to
some information that the other person does not have (such as in
the Inhibit-Task). The participant’s performance would thus be
expected to be signiﬁcantly below the controls’ performance on the
false belief but not the memory control trials of the Inhibit-Task,
while the performance on the false belief trials of the Track-Task
should be spared.
Type 2 Deficit. A deficit in tracking the other person’s belief
whereby the participant does not spontaneously track the other per-
son’s belief and/or does not know which cues from the environment
to consider to ascribe a belief content to the other person. We expect
here that the participant will have diﬃculties especially when the
task instructions do not draw attention to the other person (such as
in the Track-Task), but such diﬃculties could also be observed in
the Inhibit-Task (where belief tracking is also required). The partici-
pant’s performance would thus be expected to be signiﬁcantly below
the controls’ performance on the false belief but not the memory
control trials of the Track-Task, and this could happen with or with-
out impairment on the false belief trials of the Inhibit-Task.
Type 3 Deficit. A general cognitive deficit whereby the partici-
pant loses track of the events and applies his or her belief reasoning
on wrong or incomplete information. The participant’s perfor-
mances on the false belief and the control trials of the Track-Task
or Inhibit-Task would thus expected to be signiﬁcantly below the
controls’ performance.
A 
D 
C B 
E F
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the sequence of events in the false belief trials of the task that places high demands on the spontaneous tracking
of the other person’s perspective (Track-Task; top panel) and the false belief trials of the task that places high demands in self-perspective inhibition (Inhi-
bit-Task; bottom panel). In the Track-Task (A, B, C), participants are instructed to find in which of 2 identically looking boxes a green cube is located (impli-
cit belief reasoning instruction). (A) The woman watches in which box the green object is located (while the participant cannot see the object location). (B)
The woman leaves the room, and while she is away, the man swaps the 2 boxes. (C) The woman returns and points to one of the boxes to help finding
the green object. At this point, participants are asked to point to the box containing the green object. In the Inhibit-Task (D, E, F), participants are asked to
indicate which of the 2 boxes the woman will open first to find the green object (more explicit belief reasoning instruction). (D) The woman watches in
which box the green object is located (and this time the participant can also see the object location). (E) The woman leaves the room, and while she is
away, the man changes the object location. (F) The woman returns and participants are asked to point to the box the woman will open first. Note that a
feedback about the correct response is provided after each trial of both tasks.
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Interpersonal Reactivity Index
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) is a 28-item self-admin-
istered questionnaire (Davis, 1983; French validation by Gilet et al.,
2013). The IRI assesses diﬀerent aspects of social cognition on the
basis of 4 subscales: (i) “Empathic Concern,” that is, the ability to
be emotionally concerned by others’ feelings, (ii) “Personal Dis-
tress,” that is, the tendency to have self-oriented negative feelings in
response to others’ distress, (iii) “Perspective Taking,” that is, the
ability to adopt other’s point of view at a cognitive level, and (iv)
“Fantasy,” that is, the ability to project oneself into ﬁctional charac-
ters. Each subscale had 7 items to be rated on a 5-point Likert scale
(from 1 “it does not describe me at all” to 5 “it describes me very
well”).
Other Control Measures
Because of the frequent comorbidity between alcoholism and
symptoms of depression and anxiety, patients and control partici-
pants were presented with the Beck Depression Inventory Scale
(BDI short version in 13 items; Beck et al., 1961) and State Trait
Anxiety Inventory for adults (STAI A-B; Spielberger et al., 1983).
Global intelligence was assessed by the Raven’s Progressive
Matrix (Raven et al., 1998).
Alcohol craving was measured with the Obsessive-Compulsive
Drinking Scale (OCDS; Anton and Drobes, 1998; Roberts et al.,
1999) in a validated French version (Ansseau et al., 2000). The
OCDS questionnaire can be divided into an obsessive and a com-
pulsive subscale. Because alcohol drinking was prohibited during
detox, we used a modiﬁed version of the OCDS where the 4 compul-
sive items that are directly related to current alcohol drinking were
removed.
The study was approved by the ethical committee of the Centre
Hospitalier Universitaire, Che^ne aux Haies, Ambroise Pare.
RESULTS
Group Level Analysis
AD individuals scored signiﬁcantly higher than controls
for trait anxiety, state anxiety, depression, and alcohol crav-
ing and signiﬁcantly lower for global intelligence (see
Table 1).
Regarding the IRI, AD individuals only diﬀered from con-
trols for the “Perspective taking” subscale, t(66) = 3.43,
p = 0.001 (see Table 1).
AD individuals (mean = 8.79; SD = 3.41) also had signiﬁ-
cantly lower scores than controls (mean = 11.50; SD = 0.9)
on the false belief trials of the Track-Task, t(37.54)2
= 4.48, p < 0.001 (see Fig. 2). They also had signiﬁcantly
lower scores (mean = 9.5; SD = 3.53) than controls
(mean = 11.76; SD = 0.55) on the false belief trials of the
Inhibit-Task, t(34.63)2 = 3.7, p < 0.01. However, the 2
groups did not diﬀer on the memory control trials of the
Track-Task (AD: mean = 11.59; SD = 0.96; CT
mean = 11.74; SD = 0.45; t(66)<1, p = 0.42) or the Inhibit-
Task (AD: mean = 11.18; SD = 1.19; CT mean = 11.56;
SD = 0.75; t(55.41)2 = 1.59, p = 0.119.
Table 2. Criteria for Participants’s Classification as a Function of Their Performance on the Various Trials of the Inhibit-Task and the Track-Task
Inhibit-Task
High self-perspective inhibition demands
Low spontaneous tracking demands
Track-Task
Low self-perspective inhibition
demands
High spontaneous tracking demands
False belief Memory control Filler False belief Memory control Filler
No belief reasoning deficit Spared NAa Spared Spared NAa Spared
Type 1 deficit: Selective deficit in self-perspective inhibition Impaired Spared NAb Spared Spared Spared
Type 2 deficit: Deficit in spontaneous belief tracking Spared or Impairedc Spared Spared Impaired Spared NAb
Type 3 deficit: General cognitive deficit Impaired Impaired NAb Impaired Impaired NAb
NA, not applicable. Impairment in responses to specific tests allow to classify the alcohol-dependent individuals according to deficit types and are
depicted in bold.
aControl trials do not require belief reasoning, and thus, impairment on these trials but spared performance on belief reasoning trials is not informative
about belief reasoning.
bFiller trials are only taken into account for the classification when the performance is preserved on false belief trials as this ensures that successful
belief reasoning was not achieved via the reliance on a superficial strategy.
cA deficit in spontaneous belief tracking must result in an impairment on the false belief trials of the Track-Task. It may, however, also result in difficul-
ties in the Inhibit-Task if, even in that task, participants cannot track the relevant elements in the scene to infer that the woman in the video has a false
belief.
0
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False Belief Memory Control False Belief Memory Control
Track-Task Inhibit-Task
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Fig. 2. Group analysis: Alcohol-dependent (AD) and control (CT) partic-
ipants’ number of correct responses on the false belief and memory control
trials of false belief task that places high demands in the spontaneous
tracking of the other person’s perspective (Track-Task) and false belief
task that places high demands on self-perspective inhibition (Inhibit-Task).
Error bars represent standard errors. ns = nonsignificant; ***p < 0.001.
2Test corrected for unequal variances.
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Individual Case Analyses
The majority of AD individuals presented with no deﬁcit
(52.94%; see Fig. 3). The second most frequent pattern of
performance was that conforming to a deﬁcit in tracking the
other person’s perspective (41.18%). Among the patients
conforming to this type of deﬁcit, 71.43% had also a signiﬁ-
cantly lower score on the Inhibit-Task. The 2 other types of
deﬁcit, that is, a selective self-perspective inhibition deﬁcit
and a general deﬁcit, only occurred once (3%).
To explore the characteristics of the AD individuals with
versus without a deﬁcit in tracking the other perspective, we
performed a series of independent sample t-tests on demo-
graphic, disease-related measures, control measures, and the
IRI subscales (see Table 3). The measures that signiﬁcantly
diﬀered across the 2 groups were disease-related variables.
AD individuals showing a deﬁcit in tracking the other per-
spective also displayed longer years of alcohol abuse, a
higher level of alcohol consumption, and higher levels on the
obsessive, compulsive, and global ODCS scores. There was
also a signiﬁcant diﬀerence on Raven’s Progressive Matrix, t
(30) = 2.25, p < 0.05, with those individuals showing a deﬁ-
cit in tracking the other perspective scoring lower as a group.
The relation between the false belief reasoning proﬁle and
the general reasoning proﬁle was, however, not straightfor-
ward. Several AD individuals having no deﬁcits in belief rea-
soning had a general reasoning score that placed them lower
than the 25th percentile, while several individuals with a deﬁ-
cit in false belief reasoning had a general reasoning score
placing them above the 25th percentile (sometimes even
between the 75th and the 90th percentile). Hence, impaired
false belief reasoning performance was not necessarily associ-
ated with impaired general reasoning performance as
assessed by Raven’s Progressive Matrix.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we presented AD individuals with 2 false
belief tasks which allow to specify the types of ToM impair-
ments that these individuals may have. When considering the
whole group, we observed that AD individuals had signiﬁ-
cantly lower scores on both ToM (false belief) tasks when
compared to controls. These ﬁndings are in line with previ-
ous observations of a general ToM deﬁcit in AD individuals
(Thoma et al., 2013; Uekermann et al., 2007).
However, when each AD individual was compared to a
group of matched controls using single-case statistical analy-
ses (Crawford and Howell, 1998), we showed that the AD
group was far from homogeneous: Some subjects presented
with severe deﬁcits on the ToM tasks that can be compared
to what is observed in brain-damaged individuals (Apperly
et al., 2004) or schizophrenic patients (Bailey and Henry,
2010); other AD subjects did not diﬀer from controls. Fur-
thermore, the diﬀerence in ToM abilities among the AD sub-
jects was not related to diﬀerences in demographic variables,
intelligence scores, depression, or anxiety. However, there
was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the impaired and spared
AD individuals on disease-related variables. AD individuals
who presented with deﬁcits in the ToM tasks had a longer
history of alcoholism, used to consume a higher number of
alcohol units per day, and presented with higher craving
scores.
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Fig. 3. Single-case analyses: Distribution of the alcohol-dependent
(AD) individuals as a function of whether their pattern of performance
showed a self-perspective inhibition deficit, a deficit in tracking the other
perspective, a general cognitive deficit, or no deficit.
Table 3. Comparison of Demographic, Psychological, Cognitive, and
Illness-Related Variables Between Alcohol-Dependent (AD) Individuals
With VersusWithout Theory of Mind Deficits
AD with a deficit in
tracking the other
perspective (N = 14)
ADwith no
deficit (N = 18)
mean  SD mean  SD
Demographic variables
Male/female ratio 10/4 14/4
Age (years) 48.50  9.46 48.72  8.82
Education level (years) 11  2.48 11.83  3.33
Cigarettes per day 12.14  10.75 8.39  9.41
Smokers 9 11
Psychological and cognitive
measures
RavenMatrix 35.71  11.18 43.17  7.56*
STAI-statea 44.07  16.36 39.33  13.31
STAI-traita 50.93  12.44 48.94  13.14
BDIb 10.86  7.58 9.56  7.60
Interpersonal reactivity Index
Empathic concern 26.50  5.69 23.50  5.56
Fantasy scale 19.86  6.01 17.39  5.50
Personal distress 19.71  6.33 19.39  6.25
Perspective taking 22.07  3.69 19.39  5.79
Disease-related factors
Obsessive-Compulsive
Drinking Scale
(OCDS) obsessive thinking
7.29  4.46 4.06  3.40*
OCDS compulsive behavior 4.86  3.42 2.44  3.11*
OCDS global score 12.14  7.64 5.89  4.99**
Number of drinks per day 24.29  9.66 17.06  8.71*
Number of inpatient days 25.29  3.17 24.56  2.94
Alcoholism duration (in years) 15.64  9.90 9.00  5.99*
Previous hospitalization 2.14  1.92 1.83  1.98
aState Trait Anxiety Inventory for adults.
bBeck Depression Inventory Scale.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
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It is now increasingly acknowledged that ToM, and partic-
ularly belief reasoning, is a multifaceted ability which is un-
derpinned by distinct cognitive and neural processes
(Hartwright et al., 2012; Samson, 2009) any of which can be
selectively impaired and lead to ToM impairments. The 2
false belief tasks that we used allowed for the ﬁrst time to
explore the types of mentalizing process that may be
impaired in AD. More speciﬁcally, the tasks allowed us to
disentangle 3 types of deﬁcits that can lead to impaired per-
formance in ToM tasks: (i) a deﬁcit in dealing with the gen-
eral task demands (the subject loses track of the events and
applies his or her belief reasoning on wrong or incomplete
information), (ii) a selective deﬁcit in self-perspective inhibi-
tion (the subject wrongly attributes his or her own mental
state to other people, Samson et al., 2005), and (iii) a deﬁcit
in tracking the other person’s mental state (the subject does
not spontaneously track the other person’s belief and/or does
not know which cues from the environment to use in order
to ascribe a belief content to the other person, Samson et al.,
2004). Quite strikingly, 14 of the 16 AD individuals who
showed an impairment in the ToM tasks showed a deﬁcit in
tracking the other person’s belief.
Two additional observations are worth highlighting. First,
the good performance of these 14 AD individuals on the
memory control trials of both tasks suggests that the
patients’ diﬃculties were not merely the result of general cog-
nitive deﬁcits that interfered with the tracking of any event.
Moreover, some of these 14 AD individuals scored better
than the unimpaired AD individuals in a reasoning task out-
side the social domain (as assessed by the Raven’s Progres-
sive Matrix; Raven et al., 1998). This thus indicates that the
diﬃculties were relatively speciﬁc to belief reasoning. Second,
a majority of the 14 AD individuals who showed a deﬁcit in
tracking other people’s belief had diﬃculties not only in the
false belief task that placed the highest demands in belief
tracking (i.e., the Track-Task) but also in the false belief task
that placed high demands on self-perspective inhibition (i.e.,
the Inhibit-Task). This could be explained in 2 ways: either
the deﬁcit in tracking other’s belief is so important that it
aﬀects performance irrespective of the false belief task (this
would mean that a single deﬁcit aﬀected both tasks) or the
AD patients showed, in addition to their belief tracking diﬃ-
culties, diﬃculties in self-perspective inhibition (this would
mean that there were 2 deﬁcits, each aﬀecting one of the
tasks). The current data cannot disentangle these 2 possibili-
ties, but the data clearly exclude the interpretation that AD
patients suﬀer solely from a deﬁcit in self-perspective inhibi-
tion as has been reported in some brain-damaged patients
(Samson et al., 2005) or in the healthy elderly (Bailey and
Henry, 2008).
While self-perspective inhibition processes have been
found to be sustained by the right lateral prefrontal cortex
(Hartwright et al., 2012; Samson et al., 2005), the processes
involved in belief tracking have been associated with the
temporo-parietal junction (Samson, 2009; Samson et al.,
2004). This highlights that ToM deﬁcits in AD individuals
cannot be only explained by a frontal lobe dysfunction and
that a dysfunction of the temporo-parietal areas could also
contribute to explain the deﬁcits. Dysfunctioning of the
temporo-parietal junction is in line with evidence of
decreased parietal lobe volume in AD adolescents (Fein
et al., 2013) and adults (Jernigan et al., 1991; Sullivan, 2003;
Sullivan et al., 1996). Furthermore, it has been shown that
the parietal lobe volume decrease is positively correlated with
alcohol dose (Fein et al., 2009) and predictive of relapse
within 90 days (Rando et al., 2011). In 1 study, decrease in
parietal lobe volume has also been associated with the AD
individuals’ performance with social stimuli (i.e., in a face
name association learning; Pitel et al., 2012). We thus concur
with the suggestion by Uekermann (Uekermann and Daum,
2008; see also Bosco et al., 2014) to explore the role of other
brain areas than the frontal areas in the social cognition deﬁ-
cits observed in AD individuals.
From a clinical standpoint, further explorations are still
needed to evaluate the relation between ToM and interper-
sonal diﬃculties such as frequent family or couple diﬃculties,
professional impairments, aggression, and legal problems.
ToM deﬁcits might also inﬂuence the probability of relapse
or other diﬃculties encountered by AD patients, especially
diﬃculties of care access (Uekermann and Daum, 2008)
which result in an important treatment gap (Kohn et al.,
2004). Moreover, our study also highlighted that about half
of the AD individuals had spared ToM capacities. This
implies that, before considering a treatment to improve the
capacity of mentalizing among AD individuals, it seems
essential to determine which patient needs such remediation.
To meet this goal, more research must be carried out to
develop speciﬁc diagnostic tools for the clinicians. Finally,
the possibility of spontaneous recovery of ToM abilities after
prolonged abstinence, as it has been shown for other cogni-
tive abilities (Pitel et al., 2009), should also be tested.
CONCLUSION
In line with previous studies, we show in this study that, as
a group, AD individuals have diﬃculties in ToM. Single-case
analyses showed, however, that this is only the case for less
than 50% of the sample. The AD individuals who were
impaired consistently showed diﬃculties in tracking other
people’s mental state. Such diﬃculties have previously been
found following focal brain lesions to the temporo-parietal
junction, highlighting that frontal dysfunctions may not be
the sole origin of the social cognition deﬁcits observed in
alcohol dependence.
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